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The Supreme Court continues to struggle with complex and uncer-
tain social science evidence in constitutional cases. Ambivalence about
the proper role such evidence should play in judicial decision making
contributes to this struggle. Recent education cases illustrate key aspects
of this struggle and also show the Court's inconsistent treatment of social
science evidence.
In Grutter v. Bollinger' and, more recently, Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,2 the Supreme Court
addressed challenges to public school programs that sought to enhance
equal educational opportunity by increasing student racial and ethnic di-
versity.3 The diversity programs in both cases shared the assumption
t Professor, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Dawn Chutkow and Nicole Heise, along with the par-
ticipants in the Brown Undone? The Future of Integration in Seattle After PICS Symposium for
comments on an earlier version of this Article. Cornell Law School research librarians provided
invaluable assistance.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
2. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3. For the narrow purpose of this Article, I use the terms "race," "ethnic origin," and "ethnic-
ity" interchangeably.
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that increased student diversity generates desirable educational out-
comes, including enhanced student achievement. 4  Social science evi-
dence was pressed into service to support this shared assumption and
contributed to the University of Michigan Law School and the Seattle
School District's efforts to establish diversity as a compelling govern-
mental interest.
A comparison of the Grutter and Parents Involved opinions, how-
ever, reveals that the Court treated similar social science evidence quite
differently in the two cases, which were separated by only five years.
One critical difference was that the Court's opinion readily engaged with
the social science evidence in Grutter; in contrast, the Court's Parents
Involved decision conveyed a desire to disengage from the social science
evidence. The Court's different treatment of the social science evidence
in these two cases reflects long-standing yet persistently uneasy relations
between constitutional law and social science. The lingering unease be-
tween law and social science descends partly from the Brown v. Board of
Education opinion, specifically footnote 11.5 The increasingly bitter
contest over the rightful ownership of Brown's legacy, partly waged
through the Grutter and Parents Involved litigation, stimulated sharp
scholarly,6 public, 7 and judicial8 rhetoric. That the Brown legacy in-
cludes a substantial contribution to an increasingly empiricized equal
educational opportunity doctrine 9 only deepens the irony surrounding the
Court's current ambivalence about social science evidence in the educa-
tion context.
The full extent of what the Court decided in Grutter and Parents
Involved remains in some dispute.10 What is far more certain is that both
cases continue to stir deeply held passions that help frame public and
legal debates about the Court and its role in affirmative action and school
4. Although I am mindful that increased student diversity might generate an array of other
desirable outcomes, this Article focuses only on student achievement.
5. 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954).
6. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV.
131, 151-56 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Editorial, Resegregation Now, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2007, at A26 (describing the
decision as "radical"); Eugene Robinson, Op-Ed., Standing in the Schoolhouse Door, WASH. POST,
June 29, 2007, at A21 (arguing that Justices "stand in the schoolhouse door").
8. A comparison of Chief Justice Roberts' opinion of the Court and Justice Breyer's dissent
illustrate this point vividly. See also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Seattle and Louisville School
Cases: There is No Other Way, 121 HARV. L. REV. 158, 158 (2007) (describing the opinions of the
various Justices in Parents Involved as "impassioned").
9. For a fuller account of this point, see Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote
Eleven, and Multidisciplinarity, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 279 (2005).
10. Compare Ryan, supra note 6, with Wilkinson, supra note 8.
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desegregation disputes." Amid these increasingly raucous debates, this
Article expressly side steps the many questions (and controversies) about
what the Court decided in those cases and seeks to escape from the fre-
quently politically charged and volatile context of governmental uses of
race. This Article instead focuses on how the Court reached its decisions
in Grutter and Parents Involved and how the two decisions differ. In
assessing the "how" questions this Article dwells exclusively on the
Court's treatment of the social science evidence brought before it and
gives a particular emphasis to the quantitative social science. A better
understanding of how the Court reached its decisions in Grutter and Par-
ents Involved matters not only for legal scholars but also, and perhaps
more importantly, for future litigants and those bound by the decisions.
Two distinct, though related, factors help account for the Court's
different treatment of similar social science evidence in Grutter and Par-
ents Involved. First, the relevant constitutional doctrine is far from clear
on how and to what degree public schools may act on a student's race.
Second, challenges flowing from uncertain law are compounded by so-
cial science uncertainty. Not only are many aspects of the education en-
terprise notoriously difficult to study, but empirical support for key as-
sumptions relating to student diversity programs, such as those litigated
in Grutter and Parents Involved, is not yet settled and will likely remain
unsettled for the foreseeable future.
How the Court should handle the inherent social scientific com-
plexity and uncertainty in constitutional cases as a normative matter is
not obvious. What is obvious, however, is that such uncertainty places
enormous stress on courts seeking to enlist social science evidence into
the service of judicial decision-making. The persistently inconsistent
relation between constitutional law and social science evidence poses
especially nettlesome burdens on those charged with the responsibility to
both pursue and deliver equal educational opportunity. Constitutional
law and social science evidence co-exist awkwardly despite a relation-
ship that benefits from an august pedigree, arcing back to the Court's
seminal Brown decision. Enduring questions include whether and how
the Court should treat social science evidence when assessing the equal
educational opportunity doctrine as well as challenges to it.
11. See, e.g., RACIAL PREFERENCE AND RACIAL JUSTICE: THE NEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
CONTROVERSY (Russell Nieli ed., 1991) (a collection of views on affirmative action); CAROL
COHEN & JAMES P. STERBA, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL PREFERENCE: A DEBATE (2003)
(articulating two sides of the philosophic and moral debate surrounding affirmative action);
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF
CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS (1998) (sympathetic toward af-
firmative action); Stephan Thernstrom & Abigail Thernstrom, Reflections on The Shape of the River,
46 UCLA L. REV. 1583 (1999) (a critical review of THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER).
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The Court's past treatment of social science evidence when inter-
preting the equal educational opportunity doctrine helps frame today's
questions, including those questions litigated in Grutter and Parents In-
volved. Part II of this Article briefly summarizes the historic context
with a discussion of Brown and two other landmark cases that followed
in its wake. Part III includes a brief description of how the Court di-
gested the social science evidence pressed by litigants in Grutter and
Parents Involved. Problems arising out of the contested social science
evidence presented in Grutter and Parents Involved contribute to impor-
tant challenges that await courts forced to confront similarly contested
social science in the future. Part IV discusses the reasons behind the
court's inconsistent treatment of the use of social science evidence in
Grutter and Parents Involved. Finally, Part V concludes by considering
how courts might proceed in the face of such challenges.
II. A HISTORY OF UNEASE AND UNCERTAINTY
The problems and uncertainty that surround constitutional decision
making and social science evidence pre-date the Grutter and Parents
Involved decisions. Three seminal equal educational opportunity cases,
Brown, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,12 and Re-
gents of University of California v Bakke, 13 illustrate that tensions be-
tween constitutional law and social science evidence arose decades be-
fore the Grutter and Parents Involved cases.
A. Brown and Footnote 11
In Brown, the Court endeavored to desegregate the nation's public
schools by striking down state-sanctioned school segregation.1 4 If the
goal of desegregating (and, perhaps, integrating) America's public
schools was not difficult and controversial enough, the Court's opinion
in Brown inadvertently generated additional controversy. Anticipating
(correctly) a hostile reaction to the Brown decision, Chief Justice Warren
set out to write a brief (by legal opinion standards), uncomplicated legal
opinion in a plain, non-accusatory tone. 15 Warren astutely surmised that
a brief opinion increased the probability that it would be reprinted in its
12. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
13. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
14. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("We conclude that in the field of public
education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.").
15. See, e.g., LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 28-29
(2000).
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entirety by a larger number of the nation's newspapers, thereby reaching
a wider audience. 16
In an opinion noted for unusual brevity, a single sentence captured
the Court's core argument in Brown that the Constitution prohibits
school districts from assigning children to schools on the basis of race:
To separate [schoolchildren] from others of similar age and qualifi-
cations solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to their status in the community that ma' affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
The Court advanced a psychological argument to buttress its conclusion
of constitutional harm and referenced with favor a lower court finding
that linked the practice of state-sanctioned segregation with psychologi-
cal harms to non-white schoolchildren. 18 It was at this juncture that the
Court sought to push its psychological argument even further by support-
ing it with social science research. To do so, the Court noted that "this
finding [of psychological harm] is amply supported by modem author-
ity."' 19 It is here that Warren dropped a footnote-the much-maligned
footnote 11-which references a list of social science sources purporting
to support the Court's assertion of psychological harm suffered by non-
white schoolchildren who were denied access to specific public
schools.2°
The Court's psychological harm finding referenced in Brown's
footnote 11 featured research by Dr. Kenneth Clark. Not surprisingly,
the reference to Dr. Clark's work in the Brown opinion directed consid-
erable attention to his research. The particular study by Dr. Clark that
the Brown opinion cited involved asking a small number of African-
American school children to identify the dolls that looked "nicer" among
an array of white and black dolls. When the African-American school-
children identified the white dolls as "nicer," Dr. Clark interpreted these
findings as evidence of harm to the black schoolchildren's self-esteem. 2'
16. Id.
17. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
18. Id. (quoting unreported findings of the lower court in Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 862, 865
(1952)). Other descriptions of related harms included "[l]essening of motivation, alienation of the
child from the educational institution, distortion of personal relationships, and various forms of
antisocial behavior." Owen M. Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional
Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 569 (1965).
19. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
20. Id. at 495 n. 11.
21. See generally Kenneth B. Clark, The Effect of Prejudice and Discrimination on Personality
Development, in MIDCENTURY WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH (Edward A.
Richards, ed., 1950); Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in
Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 169 (Theodore M. Newcomb et al. eds.,
1947).
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Critically, both Dr. Clark and, by reference, the Court identified state-
sponsored school segregation as responsible (or the constitutional cause)
for the psychological harm of inadequate self-esteem.2
Although Chief Justice Warren expressly set out to minimize con-
troversy over the Brown decision (perhaps a naYve undertaking), criticism
arrived almost instantly.23 Amid the torrent of criticism, footnote 11,
especially Dr. Clark's research, attracted particular attention. From a
technical social science perspective, Dr. Clark's study did not stand up
well to close examination. Observers characterize as "astounding" the
fact that Dr. Clark's studies contributed to the foundation for one of the
Court's most important decisions in the twentieth century. 24 Critics ad-
vanced two broad attacks against footnote 11. One attack focused on the
quality of the research cited. 25 A second related attack questioned the
extent to which footnote 11 influenced the outcome in Brown.26 Debates
on both criticisms persist.
27
Technical aspects of the quality of Dr. Clark's research drew sub-
stantial criticism. Commentators characterized Dr. Clark's methodology
as crude by the less sophisticated social science standards of the mid-
1950s. 28 Many noted that Clark's study of schoolchildren and dolls in-
volved a small sample size and lacked anything resembling a control
group. 29 In addition, causation problems fueled criticisms of the Clark
study because the Court's use of Dr. Clark's research rested on the integ-
rity of a causal link between state-sponsored segregation and the plain-
tiffs' harm. In finding this causal link, the Court construed the harm in
terms of psychological harms flowing from state-enforced segregation
policies. 30 One logical inference from the Court's characterization of the
plaintiffs' harms was that such harms would not exist absent de jure
school segregation. However, results from Dr. Clark's study also in-
cluded findings that African-American children attending schools in
northern states (that is, states without dejure state-sponsored school seg-
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., POWE, supra note 15, at 34-38 (describing various reactions to the Brown deci-
sion).
24. Joseph P. Viteritti, A Truly Living Constitution: Why Educational Opportunity Trumps
Strict Separation on the Voucher Question, 57 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 94 (2000).
25. See, e.g., Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote 11 in Historical Context: Social Science
and the Supreme Court's Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 793, 803-14 (2002) (describing
the enduring debate over footnote 11 ).
26. Id.
27. Id. See generally James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Mod-
ern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003).
28. See POWE, supra note 15, at 42-43.
29. Viteritti, supra note 24, at 94.
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,494 (1954).
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regation) were even more likely to prefer white dolls than the African-
American children attending state-segregated schools in the South.3'
Consequently, this finding degraded the presumed causal link between
state-sponsored segregation and the harms pressed in the Brown litiga-
tion.
In addition to raising technical questions involving footnote lI's
underlying social science, critics also decried the footnote's implicit
influence on the outcome in Brown.32  At a theoretical level, critics re-
coiled at the possibility that the legal integrity of the Brown decision
rested upon the social scientific integrity of the evidence the Court
cited.33 Further questions arose about the implications for Brown's pre-
cedential value if the underlying social science changed over time. Many
also balked at the implicit suggestion, flowing from footnote 11, that
more traditional constitutional values were insufficient to support the
Court's decision to strike down state-enforced de jure school segrega-
tion. Most now argue that the Court need venture only as far as the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to support the conclusion
that state-sponsored school segregation is unconstitutional.34 Such an
argument, though perfectly obvious today, was less obvious fifty years
ago. Nevertheless, footnote 11 has not weathered the test of time well.
Most leading constitutional scholars today (granted, with the consider-
able benefit of hindsight) eschew the particular evidentiary path taken by
the Court in Brown.35
31. POWE, supra note 15, at 43; NORMAN L. SILBER, WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: THE LIFE
OF PHILIP ELMAN 215 (2004).
32. Although the inclusion of social science evidence invited sustained criticism, at least one
scholar suggests that, criticisms aside, the social scientific evidence probably played a minor role, at
best, in the decision itself. See generally Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation:
Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979).
33. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959) (criticizing the manner in which the Brown opinion uses Dr. Kenneth Clark's doll
studies research); Mody, supra note 25, at 805 (quoting Professor Edmond Cahn: "I would not have
the constitutional rights of [any Americans] rest on any such flimsy foundation as some of the scien-
tific demonstrations in the records.").
34. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Rewriting Brown, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
35. See id at 52 (arguing that many of today's constitutional scholars disagree with Chief
Justice Warren's reliance on social science evidence). In an interesting thought experiment, in 2000,
Professor Jack Balkin gathered eight other constitutional law scholars to re-write the Brown opinion.
(The participants included: Professors Bruce Ackerman, Jack Balkin, Derrick Bell, Drew Days, 1II,
John Hart Ely, Catherine MacKinnon, (now-Judge) Michael McConnell, Frank Michelman, and
Cass Sunstein.). As Balkin notes, most declined to rely on empirical social science evidence as
proof of the unconstitutionality of state-segregated public schools. Id. Although Professor Ely
relied upon the notion of psychological harm, he did not cite to the sources identified in footnote 11.
Id. Professor MacKinnon accepted the social science evidence relied upon in Brown, though she
interpreted the evidence quite differently than did Chief Justice Warren on behalf of the Court. Id.
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B. Rodriguez and the Complex Relation Between
Local Property Values and Per Pupil Spending
Almost twenty years after the Brown decision, the Court was once
again called upon to assess the constitutional dimensions of equal educa-
tional opportunities. Unlike the Brown case that featured race, the Rod-
riguez case confronted a constitutional challenge to intrastate per pupil
spending variations that pivoted on the happenstance of geography and
property tax bases. 36  The plaintiffs in Rodriguez advanced empirical
support for an assumption critical to their constitutional claim: that low-
income families were clustered in property-poor school districts noted
partly by their comparatively lower per pupil spending.
Variations in property values across school districts (in Texas and
elsewhere) generated variations in local property revenue streams. These
revenue stream variations directly contributed to per pupil spending dif-
ferences. The plaintiffs in Rodriguez asked the district court to assess
whether the sometimes substantial per pupil spending differences across
districts within the state and generated by Texas' local property tax-
based school finance system violated the federal Equal Protection
Clause. The district court panel construed education as a fundamental
right and wealth as a suspect classification and, as a consequence, ap-
plied strict judicial scrutiny. 37 The court accepted the plaintiffs' asser-
tion that low-income families were clustered in low-wealth schools.
38
The district court concluded that variations in per pupil spending be-
tween the Alamo Heights and Edgewood schools, flowing from the hap-
penstance of geography, violated the Equal Protection Clause.39
Not surprisingly, the San Antonio School District quickly appealed
the adverse district court decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court,
after declaring that education was not a fundamental right4° and that
wealth was not a suspect classification, 41 applied a rational relation test
and concluded that it "could not say that such (per pupil funding) dispari-
ties are the product of a system that is so irrational as to be invidiously
36. Whether Rodriguez would have been better framed as a race rather than a resources case
endures as an interesting question. For a discussion, see Goodwin Liu, The Parted Paths of School
Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 LAW & INEQ. 81 (2006).
37. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
38. Id. at 282 and n.3.
39. Id. at 285. The district court also identified various violations of the Texas Constitution
and Education Code that contributed to plaintiffs' harm.
40. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.
41. Id. at 18-25.
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discriminatory. 42 Thus, the Court felt that the Equal Protection Clause
tolerated the per pupil funding differences in Texas.
Similar to the Brown opinion, social science evidence informed the
Court's analysis in Rodriguez. The plaintiffs' central claim in Rodriguez
was that low-income families were clustered in property-poor school dis-
tricts and that this geographic clustering interacted with the Texas school
finance system in a manner that discriminated against low-income
students in terms of lower per pupil spending. The plaintiffs' claim,
however, necessarily assumed a relation between low-income households
and low school district wealth. This was an assumption that the district
court accepted.43 Indeed, accepting the plaintiffs' assumption facilitated
the district court's conclusion that the Texas school finance law violated
the Constitution.44
In reversing the lower court ruling, the Supreme Court relied upon a
social science study that tested the assumed relation between family
wealth and school district wealth.45  The study analyzed data from the
130 largest towns in Connecticut, which accounted for 95 percent of the
state population and 96 percent of the state's total property value. These
data were used to assess the relation between individual and school dis-
trict wealth.
The Connecticut study used partial correlations analysis46 of the
various combinations of family and school district wealth to uncover
several interesting findings. First, when poverty was construed to mean
"percent of population living below the poverty line," no statistically
significant correlation existed between families in poverty and total dis-
trict per pupil spending.47 Second, when district wealth was construed
more narrowly and only in terms of residential property value, a statisti-
cally significant relation emerged between school district wealth and
family poverty. 48 Third, when district wealth was defined in terms of
business wealth, a positive correlation emerged with family poverty. In
other words, poor families tended to cluster in wealthier areas, but only
where wealth was construed in terms of commercial and industrial prop-
erty value. 49  The study found that, at best, the statistical relation be-
42. Id. at 55.
43. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 (W.D. Tex., 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
44. Id. at 285.
45. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 23 n.53 (citing Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance
Decisions: On Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972)).
46. See Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On Winning Battles and
Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303, 1326, 1330 n.1 14 (1972).
47. Id. at 1327.
48. Id. at 1328.
49. Id.
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tween families living in poverty and school district wealth was ambigu-
ous. Thus, the study concluded that "the popular belief that the 'poor'
[families] live in 'poor' [school] districts is clearly mistaken." 50  The
conclusion undermined a key plaintiff argument advanced by the plain-
tiffs in Rodriguez and accepted by the trial court: that low-income
households were clustered in low-wealth school districts.
Although the Connecticut study's methodology might be viewed as
unsophisticated by today's standards, it was acceptable at the time the
work was published in 1972. In terms of its probative value to the Rod-
riguez case, however, the study possessed important limitations. Nota-
bly, the study used cross-sectional data from one year (1970) and from
one state (Connecticut) while the Rodriguez case involved facts and liti-
gants from another state, the state of Texas. Whether findings from
Connecticut could properly be generalized to Texas (or any other state)
remained unclear. Indeed, the Court recognized this uncertainty when it
wondered whether the statistical findings in Connecticut "would be dis-
covered in Texas. 51
A separate question involved what the Court should do about the
uncertainty surrounding the potential applicability of data drawn from
Connecticut to a dispute in Texas. Although general social science
norms counsel against drawing inferences across states absent persuasive
evidence that the two states are similar in salient respects, the Court in-
dulged just such an inference. The analytic move, while subtle, is criti-
cal. Building off the 1970 empirical study of Connecticut school districts,
the Court accepted as a general proposition that poor families did not
cluster in low-wealth school districts. 52 Despite Justice Marshall's vig-
orous dissent, 53 the Court applied the findings from the Connecticut
study to support an assumption that poor families did not cluster in low-
wealth districts in Texas as well. Given this assumption, the Court im-
plicitly took the position that it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs in
Rodriguez the establish the opposite position, that poor families in Texas
did, in fact, cluster in poor school districts, such as Edgewood. Because
the plaintiffs in Rodriguez did not do so, the Court rejected an assump-
tion critical to their case. 54
50. Id. at 1327.
51. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. 411 U.S. 1, 23 (1973).
52. Id. (concluding there was no reason to assume that poor families in Texas cluster in poor
spending school districts).
53. Id. at 94-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 23 (concluding there was no reason to assume that poor families in Texas cluster in
poor spending school districts).
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Criticism of the majority's use of social science evidence in Rodri-
guez was not hard to find.55 Unlike the unanimous Brown decision, the
Court in Rodriguez split 5-4. That such a decision provoked dissenting
opinions is unremarkable; that the dissents included a sophisticated so-
cial scientific critique is unusual.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent, quickly delved into problems with
the majority opinion's use of the Connecticut study. Marshall noted that
the district court accepted the social science evidence offered in support
of the proposition that, in Texas, "poor people live in property-poor
[school] districts. 56 According to Marshall, "the Court rejects the Dis-
trict Court's finding of a correlation between poor people and poor dis-
tricts with the assertion that 'there is reason to believe that the poorest
families are not necessarily clustered in the poorest property districts' in
Texas. 57
Marshall advanced three criticisms of the majority's reliance on the
Connecticut study. First, Marshall pointedly noted that the Court "offers
absolutely no data-which it cannot on this record---concerning the
[geographic] distribution of poor people in Texas. 58 Second, Marshall
called into question, as previously discussed, the applicability of results
from a study of Connecticut households to Texas households, especially
given the structural, economic, and physical differences between the two
states. Marshall noted that, among other factors, "common sense" sug-
gested the relevance of the results from the Connecticut study as applied
to the Texas plaintiffs was "doubtful at best.
59
Interestingly, Marshall's third critique of the majority's use of the
Connecticut study was law-based and moored in legal procedure. Spe-
cifically, Marshall emphasized that the plaintiffs' empirical evidence
supporting the proposition that, in Texas, "poor people live in property-
poor [school] districts" was unchallenged by the defendants at trial and
was accepted by the district court. 60 Marshall complained that the major-
ity opinion conveyed a willingness to "permit appellants [defendants] to
litigate the correctness of those data for the first time before this tribunal
[the Supreme Court] where effective response by appellees [plaintiffs] is
55. Indeed, one need look no further than the dissenting opinions the Rodriguez decision
prompted. See, e.g., id. at 94-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 94 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 95 n.56.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 95.
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impossible., 61  Marshall closed his critique with the observation that
such a move was "both unfair and judicially unsound. 62
Marshall's multi-faceted critique of the Court's use of the social
science evidence in Rodriguez raises important questions. Justice Mar-
shall expressly questioned the generalizability of the Connecticut study
to the contested facts in Rodriguez. This critique laid bare an issue upon
which even the majority recognized it was vulnerable, especially in light
of general social scientific norms.63 Rather than adopt a prudent, cau-
tious course, which is the traditional course pursued by social scientists,
the majority instead imposed an ex poste burden upon the plaintiffs to
disprove the Connecticut study's applicability to Texas. When the plain-
tiffs failed to meet such a burden, the majority went on to conclude that
there was no empirical basis to assume that the poorest families concen-
trate in the poorest school districts. 64 The majority's response to the gen-
eralizability critique, such as it was, involved little more than burden
placement switch. Such a burden placement, however, is inconsistent
with standard social science protocol.
Some empirical support existed for the plaintiffs' contention that
poor families in Texas concentrated in poor school districts, a contention
critical to their claim of unequal treatment. Indeed, the district court re-
lied upon findings from a study presented in an affidavit submitted by a
social scientist.65 The study involved a sample of 100 Texas school dis-
tricts and found a correlation between the amount of a district's taxable
wealth and per pupil spending. 66 The majority opinion, however, dis-
missed these findings by referring to questions surrounding the study's
methodology 67 as well as the findings' germaness to the constitutional
question presented.68 Thus, the Court created an empirical vacuum by
dismissing the empirical evidence relied upon by the district court. Hav-
ing created an empirical vacuum, the majority then quickly filled it by
substituting the Connecticut study that was not published until long after
the litigation commenced.
The majority's move to replace empirical findings from the Texas
study, which were favorable to the plaintiffs, with findings from the
61. Id.
62. Id
63. The majority admits "whether a similar pattern would be discovered in Texas is not
known...." Id. at 23.
64. Id.
65. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 282 n.3 (W.D. Texas, 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
66. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16 n.38.
67. Id. at 15 n.38 (noting that the Texas study's methodology "has been questioned").
68. Id. at 27 (noting that even if the Texas study framed relevant questions, "no factual basis
exists upon which to found a claim of comparative wealth discrimination").
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Connecticut study, which were favorable to the defendant, provided the
foundation for Justice Marshall's procedural objection. Justice Marshall
noted that the procedural unfairness of the majority essentially substi-
tuted its preferred empirical evidence sua sponte.69 By doing so, the
majority ensured that the plaintiffs could not meet the burden that the
majority had assigned to them.
A substantial time lag separated when the Rodriguez case was ar-
gued to the district court in 1968 and when the district court announced
its decision in 1971. This added an additional complicating wrinkle to
the social science dimension of the case. It is easy to criticize the Court
for its decision to incorporate into the opinion social science evidence
that was not raised at trial. However, the social science evidence that the
majority preferred did not exist in 1968 when the lawsuit was filed. The
Connecticut study emerged in 1972, just in time for the Justices to con-
sider it before the Court announced the Rodriguez opinion in 1973. Set-
ting aside important questions about the Connecticut study's probative
value, independent questions arise about whether the Court should have
ignored evidence that emerged after trial.
Structural time lags incident to the litigation process are inevitable,
and they pose a particular burden on courts inclined to use empirical evi-
dence. Legal and procedural concerns, as Justice Marshall noted in his
dissent, argue against the majority referencing results from the Connecti-
cut study because those results did not exist when the trial began. From
a social science perspective, however, it would be odd to advance a cri-
tique against more refined knowledge just because it is comparatively
new. Assessments of the integrity of social science results pivot on the
results themselves rather than the results' age. The different way courts
of law and social scientists accommodate time lags illustrate one way
courts are comparatively less well-equipped to accommodate social sci-
ence evidence.
C. Bakke, Diversity, and Compelling Interests
Although as an affirmative action case Bakke was especially ger-
mane to the Grutter and Parents Involved decisions, from a social sci-
ence perspective Bakke offers comparatively little. In Bakke, the Court
permitted the University of California's use of race in its admissions
program. 70 Justice Powell, writing alone, concluded that a desire for ra-
cial diversity in higher education justified a race-conscious admissions
69. Id. at 95.
70. Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978).
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system. 71 Whether diversity interests constituted a compelling govern-
mental interest as it relates to higher education, was not clarified until
72twenty-five years later in Grutter. Justice Powell moored his diversity
rationale in a straightforward assumption: "educational benefits.., flow
from an ethnically diverse student body. 73
Justice Powell argued that the benefits of integrated education ac-
crue to all students 74 and that some affirmative action to increase diver-
sity was therefore appropriate. The goal of "a diverse student body," he
said, "clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of
higher education .... [I]t is not too much to say that 'the nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to' the ideas and
mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many peoples."7 5  Of
course, even to Justice Powell diversity was not "a magical phrase that a
university could incant whenever it found itself in trouble., 76 Indeed,
despite Justice Powell's support for affirmative action programs in gen-
eral, he agreed with the lower court's injunction directing Allan Bakke's
admission to the University of California, Davis Medical School.77
Justice Powell's opinion emphasized the critical point that diversity
may enable an educational affirmative action program to pass constitu-
tional muster because democratic and dialogic educational benefits ac-
crue to all students. To illustrate and evidence his point, Justice Powell
attached an appendix to his opinion that detailed the Harvard College
Admissions Program. Harvard administrators (and, of course, many oth-
ers) believe that "diversity adds an essential ingredient to the educational
process" and, as a consequence, this belief informs Harvard's admissions
program. 78
Implicit in Justice Powell's opinion are many claims, which are, at
bottom, empirical. A footnote anchored Justice Powell's assumption
about educational benefits. It asserted that "People do not learn very
much when they are surrounded only by the likes of themselves., 79 To
support his proposition, Justice Powell offered only that "[O]ur tradition
and experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity
is substantial."' 80 According to at least one commentator, Powell drew
71. Id. at 311-15.
72. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-33 (2003).
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 306.
74. Id. at 323 (Appendix to opinion of Powell, J.).
75. Id. at 311-13 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
76. Akhil Amar & Neal Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1475, 1751 (1996).
77. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
78. Id. at 322-23 (Appendix to opinion ofPowell, J.).
79. Id. at 312 n.48.
80. Id. at 313.
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only on this anecdote to support what is now commonly known as the
"diversity rationale" for affirmative action in education. 81 However, at
the time of Bakke, precious little empirical work addressed the underly-
ing claim about educational benefits. Moreover, the Bakke decision itself,
along with Justice Powell's analysis, "spawned little empirical work on
the effects of racial diversity in higher education. 82 The reluctance of
scholars to take up the arduous and politically-charged research on the
possible effects of racial diversity in higher education 83 influenced the
Court's subsequent treatment of the related legal issues.
III. GRUTTER AND PARENTS INVOLVED
The Court's past treatment of social science research bearing on the
equal educational opportunity doctrine in Brown, Rodriguez, and Bakke
influenced the Court's treatment of the social science evidence advanced
by the litigants in Grutter and Parents Involved. Although the Grutter
and Parents Involved cases differed in many respects, including that the
former involved law school affirmative action and the latter voluntary K-
12 school integration, both cases involved the use of student race by the
state in an effort to enhance diversity. Both cases also involved the
Court confronting social science evidence concerning the relation be-
tween student diversity and educational outcomes. Critical, however, are
the different ways the Court treated similar social science evidence in
decisions separated by only five years.
A. Grutter
In Grutter, the Supreme Court concluded that the University of
Michigan Law School's Admissions Office could use student race as a
factor for admissions so long as it did so with the utmost care.84 The
Supreme Court's opinion rested, to some degree, on empirical evidence,
generated and presented by the University of Michigan and amici curiae,
supporting the argument that "the educational benefits that diversity is
designed to produce . . . are substantial., 85  A sharply-divided Court
agreed with the University of Michigan's position that substantial bene-
fits flow from diversity and that these benefits contribute to a compelling
81. See Justin Pidot, Intuition or Proof- The Social Science Justification for the Diversity Ra-
tionale in Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, 59 STAN. L. REV. 761, 762 (2006).
82. Id. (citing William C. Kidder, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Recent Develop-
ments in Litigation, Admissions and Diversity Research, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 173, 221
(2001)).
83. In addition to some researchers' possible aversion to the issue, problems with access to
necessary data surely contribute to the relative paucity of empirical work in this field.
84. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
85. Id. at 330.
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interest. The Court's analysis in Grutter revealed an unusually
deferential bow to the law school's expertise in assessing such benefits.86
Furthermore, the Court accepted the law school's assertion that the desire
to achieve a more diverse student body was "at the heart" of its proper
institutional mission, partly based on the asserted educational benefits
flowing from diversity. 87 The Court also expressly presumed that the
law school was acting in good faith to accomplish that mission.88
A review of the competing empirical research claims entered into
evidence in Grutter, however, illustrates the degree of social science un-
certainty that surrounded the relation between student diversity and edu-
cational achievement. Although several studies were admitted into evi-
dence in the Grutter case, the Gurin Report,89 prepared by Professor
Patricia Gurin of the Psychology and Women's Studies departments at
the University of Michigan, took center stage in the Court's opinion.
The Gurin Report prompted responses from many social scientists, in-
cluding Thomas Wood and Malcolm Sherman9" as well as Robert Lerner
and Althea Nagai. 9'
The Gurin Report presented findings from a study launched by the
University of Michigan in anticipation of the Grutter litigation. The re-
port supported favorable conclusions about diversity's influence on edu-
cational and "democracy" outcomes. 92 According to Gurin, students ex-
posed to the greatest amount of diversity in classrooms possessed the
"greatest engagement in active thinking processes, growth in intellectual
engagement and motivation, and growth in intellectual and academic
skills." 93
Critics of the Gurin Report advanced a multi-pronged attack on its
findings. The first prong involved problems with the Gurin Report itself.
Critics pointed to a number of methodological and theoretical problems
86. Id. at 328-29.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 329.
89. Expert Witness Report of Patricia Y. Gurin, Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D.
Mich. 2001) (No. 97-75321), 1998 WL 35140040 [hereinafter Gurin Report], reprinted in Patricia
Y. Gurin, Expert Report, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 363 (1999).
90. Thomas E. Wood & Malcolm J. Sherman, Race and Higher Education: Why
Justice Powell's Diversity Rationale for Preferences in Higher Education Must Be
Rejected, NAT'L ASS'N OF SCHOLARS, May 2001, available at
http://www.nas.org/polReports.cfmDoc_ld=89&sizecode=DOC. See also Brief for Amicus Cu-
riae Nat'l Ass'n of Scholars, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL
145515.
91. Robert Lerner & Althea K. Nagai, A Critique of the Expert Report of Patricia
Gurin in Gratz v. Bollinger, CTR. FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, 2001,
http://www.ceousa.org/content/view/347/100/.
92. Gurin Report, supra note 89, at 365-66.
93. Id. at 365.
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with the findings presented in the Gurin Report and relied upon by the
Court in Grutter. For example, critics noted that challenges to defining
the term "diversity" in a manner amenable to empirical analyses are le-
gion.94 According to one critic, as a term "diversity has become a uni-
versal good presumed to be so self-evident that it need never be defined
or can conveniently be redefined according to the occasion." 95 Even if
diversity was construed crudely in terms of a school's racial composi-
tion, such an operationalization reduced diversity to little more than skin
pigmentation. 96 The approach Gurin adopted in her expert report, how-
ever, possessed important additional limitations. Gurin construed "class-
room diversity" as a bivariate variable signaling "1" anytime a student
enrolled in an ethnic studies class 97 or based on student self-reports of
whether he or she had ever taken a class that significantly influenced
their views on racial diversity or multiculturalism. 98 Critics complained
that Gurin's approach toward construing diversity was "not only mis-
leading, but potentially offensive in their assumptions." 99
Another attack on the Gurin Report dwelled on contrary social sci-
ence evidence from other competing studies. Specifically, "many" stud-
ies found that increased student diversity does not correlate with educa-
tional outcomes.' 00 Other research found that student diversity had no
effect, positive or negative, on college students' academic perform-
ance.101 Similarly, researchers comparing college achievement levels for
students attending historically black and predominately white colleges
found no significant differences.' 02 Another research team, also using
the same historically black, predominately white college data set, found
that students attending historically black colleges scored higher on a
writing skills test than their predominately white college-attending coun-
terparts. 1
0 3
94. See, e.g., John H. Bunzel, The Diversity Dialogues in Higher Education, 29 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 489 (2001).
95. Id. at 490.
96. See Brian N. Lizotte, The Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uncompelling, 11 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 625, 647 (2006).
97. See Gurin Report, supra note 89, at 382.
98. Id.
99. Lizotte, supra note 96, at 648.
100. Id. at 636.
101. See Harry Holzer & David Neumark, Assessing Affirmative Action, 38 J. OF ECON.
LITERATURE 483 (2000).
102. Louise Bohr et al., Do Black Students Learn More at Historically Black or Predominately
White Colleges?, 36 J. OF COLL. STUDENT DEV. 75, 77-79 (1995).
103. Ernest T. Pascarella et al., Influences on Students' Openness to Diversity and Challenge in
the First Year of College, 67 J. OF HIGHER EDUC. 174 (1996). See also Lizotte, supra note 96, at
636.
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These attacks and others diluted the Gurin Report's probative value.
Questions about the social scientific base for a key university assertion-
that student diversity generates educational benefits-did not pass unre-
marked by litigants. The plaintiffs argued that the university's reliance
on the Gurin Report was misplaced because "[t]he methodology and
conclusions of the University of Michigan professor Patricia Gurin have
been devastated both in arguments to the district court and in searching
critiques conducted by others."'' 0 4 Problems with the Gurin Report posed
consequences for the University of Michigan's legal position. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs argued (albeit unsuccessfully) that the university
failed in its burden to identify educational benefits uniquely attributable
to student racial diversity in part due to flaws with and limitations to the
Gurin Report. 1
05
Notwithstanding important questions about the Gurin Report and
despite plaintiffs objections, the majority of the Justices were persuaded
by the empirical support for educational benefits attributable to student
diversity. The Court concluded that such benefits are "substantial" and
relied on "numerous studies [that] show that student body diversity pro-
motes learning outcomes."10 6 Though it is not entirely clear, the Court
presumably relied on the Gurin Report. 107 In dissent, Justice Thomas
argued that the Court failed to account for evidence (conflicting with the
findings in the Gurin Report) which suggested that increased diversity
works to the disadvantage of some black students. 1
08
B. Parents Involved
More recently, in Parents Involved, the Court rejected the Seattle
School District's use of race in student assignments. 109 Although a few
years earlier in Grutter the Court directly engaged with the empirical
support for educational benefits flowing from student diversity, in Par-
ents Involved the Court appeared to disengage from the relevant
empirical literature and social science debate. Indeed, the Court ex-
104. Final Brief of Appellee at 28, Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 01-
1447, 01-1516) (citing Thomas E. Wood & Malcolm J. Sherman, Race and Higher Education: Why
Justice Powell's Diversity Rationale for Preferences in Higher Education Must Be Rejected, NAT'L
AsS'N OF SCHOLARS, May 2001, available at
http://www.nas.org/polReports.cfm?Doc_ld=89&sizecode=DOC; Brief for Amicus Curiae Nat'l
Ass'n of Scholars, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (No. 02-516), 2003 WL 145515)(internal
citations omitted).
105. Id.
106. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
107. See, e.g., Pidot, supra note 81, at 804 (noting that the Court's language "suggests a reli-
ance on the Gurin Study").
108. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 (2007).
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pressly sidestepped (and, perhaps, stepped back from) the debate by not-
ing only that the parties and their amici dispute whether racial diversity
in schools "in fact has a marked impact on [student] test scores and other
objective yardsticks or achieves intangible socialization benefits."" 0
Despite its best efforts to avoid engaging with the debate over the
relation between student diversity and educational benefits, the Court in
Parents Involved did not escape cleanly. Indeed, having announced its
desire to avoid the empirical debate regarding diversity and achievement,
the Court then proceeded to criticize the school districts for failing to
offer evidence supporting their assertion that educational benefits arise
when a school's racial composition more closely reflects the racial com-
position of the district.11" ' The Court described the district's failure to
work "forward from some demonstration of the level of diversity that
provides the purported [educational] benefits" as a "fatal flaw."'1 12  Pre-
sumably, such evidence would be empirical.
Justice Thomas' concurrence and Justice Breyer's dissent illustrate
that individual Justices did not recoil from the social science relied upon
by the litigants and numerous amici.113  Although both Thomas and
Breyer referenced the same empirical research and literature, they did so
to achieve radically different legal points.
Justice Thomas' concurring opinion exploited the uncertainty sur-
rounding the relation between student diversity and educational out-
comes to undermine legal support for the proposition that increased stu-
dent diversity constitutes a compelling governmental interest. In Justice
Thomas' view, the critical proposition is "hotly disputed among social
scientists" 114 and the relevant social science is "inconclusive."' 15  To
demonstrate this point, Justice Thomas cited to a wide array of conclu-
sions found in the research literature. 116 Finally, Justice Thomas
110. Id. at 2755.
111. Id. at 2756.
112. Id. at 2757.
113. Notable social science evidence presented by amici includes the Brief of 553 Social Sci-
entists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seat-
tle School District No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 2927079 (arguing that
social science research supports the districts' use of race); Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Them-
strom, & Stephan Themstrom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL
2453607 (arguing that the social science research does not support the districts' use of race).
114. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2776.
115. Id. at 2777.
116. For research finding benefits to black students attributable to increased student racial
diversity, see, e.g., Robert L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, Desegregation and the Black Achievement: A
Review of the Research, 42 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 48 (1978). For research finding no such
benefits, see, e.g., David J. Armor & Christine H. Rossell, Desegregation and Resegregation in the
Public Schools, in BEYOND THE COLOR LINE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACE AND ETHNICITY IN
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referenced data from the Seattle School District that appeared to undercut
the district's own legal assertions." 7
In contrast, in his dissent, Justice Breyer set out to leverage the
same social science uncertainty in a manner that favored the Seattle
School District's decision to use student race in school admissions. To
support his conclusion that a compelling governmental interest existed,
Justice Breyer noted "historical and remedial,"" 8 as well as "educa-
tional" 119 elements. As to the latter, Breyer cited to empirical research
supporting the assertion that increased student diversity correlated with
"positive academic gains." 1 20 Indeed, Breyer characterized the research
support for the assertion as "well established." 
121
At this point, however, Justice Breyer's dissent took a somewhat
unusual tack by altering course slightly. Specifically, having previously
characterized the relation between diversity and student academic gains
as "well established," Breyer went on to acknowledge that "[o]ther
studies reach different conclusions."' 122 Noting the conflicting studies
cited in Justice Thomas' concurring opinion, Justice Breyer carefully
recast his characterization of the relevant empirical support as "well es-
tablished and strong enough to permit a democratically elected school
board reasonably to determine that this interest [student diversity] is a
compelling one." 
123
Justice Breyer's subtle move warrants close attention. After bow-
ing to the reality that social science support for diversity programs is, at
the very least, contested, Breyer's next move was to shift the relevant
reference point for the Court's assessment of such evidence. Justice
Breyer implied that rather than assess whether the social science evi-
dence persuasively supported the asserted relation between student diver-
sity and achievement, the Court need only persuade itself that the exist-
ing social science evidence-even though contested-was plausible
enough to support a good-faith belief by the school district the educa-
tional benefits arise from increased diversity. At that point, federalism
AMERICA 239, 251 (Abigail Thernstrom & Stephen Thernstrom eds. 2002). For somewhat ambigu-
ous research, see, e.g., Ronald D. Henderson et al., High Quality Schooling for African American
Students, in BEYOND DESEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF QUALITY EDUCATION IN AFRICAN
AMERICAN SCHOOLING (Mwalimu J. Shujaa ed. 1996).
117. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2778 n.13.
118. Id. at 2820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2821. The Appendix to Breyer's dissenting opinion reprints an array of descriptive
empirical support. Id. at 2837-42.
122. Id. at 2821.
123. Id.
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and institutional competence concerns perform the remaining analytic
work necessary to reach a legal outcome favorable to the school district.
IV. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE COURT'S INCONSISTENT
TREATMENT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE
What might account for the Court's inconsistent use of similar so-
cial science data in connection with the proposition that student diversity
generates educational benefits in the Grutter and Parents Involved opin-
ions? After all, clearly no sea change took place in the social science
literature during the relatively small number of years that separate these
two cases. More likely is that the Court's inconsistent treatment of the
empirical evidence reflects judicial ambivalence about how courts should
engage social science evidence. Two factors fuel this ambivalence.
First, a general lingering unease surrounds the use of social science evi-
dence as support for legal conclusions in judicial opinions, especially
those involving core constitutional decisions. Second, in the education
context in particular, uncertain constitutional doctrine and ambiguous
social science interact in a manner that fuels additional judicial ambiva-
lence about the utility of social science evidence.
A. General Judicial Ambivalence About the Role
of Social Science in Constitutional Decision Making
Reliance on social science evidence in judicial decisions, especially
in constitutional cases, continues to make many scholars and courts un-
easy. 124 Critical differences separate legal and social science cultures,
norms, standards, and practices and contribute to this unease. In the le-
gal (civil) context, as a general rule courts require evidence to exceed the
"preponderance" (or "more likely than not") threshold. 125 In contrast,
most social science disciplines impose a comparatively higher standard
of proof. For example, social science convention suggests that "statisti-
cal significance," a term of art among social scientists, requires that evi-
dence that an observed result might be explained by random chance be
less than five percent (or that p < .05). 126
124. See, e.g., Jonathan Simon, Katz at Forty: A Sociological Jurisprudence Whose Time Has
Come, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935 (2008) (describing reasons for the lack of development of more
empirical evidence in the Fourth Amendment context); Howard T. Markey, Jurisprudence or "Ju-
riscience"?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 525 (1984) (describing various courts' responses to litigants'
desire to introduce technical, science, and social science evidence into trials).
125. See generally MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 794 (E. Cleary 2d
ed. 1972); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework For Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-
Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1159 (1983).
126. On the role of statistics in establishing a prima facie case in discrimination litigation, see
generally Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); DAVID BALDUS & JAMES W.L. COLE,
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
Not only do standards vary between legal and social science con-
texts, but standards within social science disciplines vary over time as
well. Additional difficulties arise from evolving data quality and data
availability. Consequently, what is viewed as "state of the art" social
science today might be deemed hopelessly flawed tomorrow. This ob-
servation is not meant to cast any undue aspersions on prior social sci-
ence work. After all, current and future social science advances build
and expand on past work. That more, newer, and sometimes better data
emerge and that statistical techniques and computational power continue
to improve over time is an inherent strength and not a sign of structural
weakness for the social sciences.
Even if social science was stable in terms of its findings, norms,
and standards, institutional capacity challenges also lurk. Courts of law
are, in one sense, forums designed to resolve legal disputes rather than to
assess social science research. Litigation's inherently adversarial context
is ill-designed for a careful review of potentially conflicting research
findings. '27 Also, many Justices lack the background and formal training
in such fields as economics, political science, psychology, and sociology.
As such, the Justices might not be equipped to distinguish between
methodologically sound and suspect research. 128
Finally, even if one sets aside technical and institutional qualms
flowing from the Court's use of empirical social science evidence, some
criticize the Court for turning to such evidence in constitutional cases,
especially those involving the equal protection clause. 129 One core con-
cern is that by relying on social science evidence to decide equal protec-
tion cases, the Court risks "demeaning" the moral principles embodied in
the Fourteenth Amendment. 130 Indeed, leading constitutional law schol-
ars today basically avoid the particular path taken by the Court in
Brown.131
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION (1980). The Supreme Court has implied that a P-value of
.05 or less is needed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Casteneda v. Partida, 430
U.S. 482, 497 n.17 (1977). See generally David H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Rele-
vant?, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1333 (1986).
127. See Michael Heise, The Courts, Educational Policy, and Unintended Consequences, 11
CORNELL J.L AND PUB. POL'Y 633, 654-57 (2002) (noting courts' struggles assessing social science
evidence in education policy cases).
128. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093-94 (2000).
129. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; Lizotte, supra note 96, at 630; Charles L.
Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960); Edmund
Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 167 (1955).
131. Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of Education-A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN
V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 52 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001). In an interesting
"thought experiment," in 2000 Professor Jack Balkin gathered eight other constitutional law scholars
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B. Uncertain Law and Uncertain Social Science
Even if as a general matter Justices welcomed and, indeed, sought
out, social science evidence for their judicial opinions, uncertain law and
social science in the education context complicate efforts to incorporate
relevant empirical evidence. Examples of legal uncertainty include ques-
tions about what amount of proof is required to demonstrate student di-
versity's educational benefits as well as the inefficacy of alternative race-
neutral measures. Uncertain or ambiguous social science muddies the
water even further. The research literature on the relation between stu-
dent diversity and academic achievement, for example, remains
unsettled. Either one of these sources of uncertainty raises serious prob-
lems. The interaction of both sources dramatically increases the degree
of difficulty for Justices inclined to draw on social science evidence.
1. Legal Uncertainty
Neither Grutter nor Parents Involved supplied much firm legal
guidance for public school districts contemplating student diversity poli-
cies that necessarily venture into an already murky area of constitutional
law. After Grutter and Parents Involved, it is reasonably clear that a ma-
jority of Justices construe student diversity as compelling in the higher
education setting as well as a remedy for past discrimination. 132 Also
reasonably certain is that the student diversity programs in Parents In-
volved (operating in Louisville and Seattle) were not narrowly tailored in
a constitutional sense. 133 Aside from these two points, however, a host
of other key legal questions remain unanswered. Decidedly unclear, for
example, is whether a majority of the current Justices construe student
diversity in the K-12 setting as compelling, in large part because Justice
Kennedy's crucial swing opinion, a model of opacity, 134 did not ex-
pressly commit. What Justice Kennedy wrote provides mere hints. For
example, Kennedy suggested that pursuing a diverse student body, "one
aspect of which is its racial composition"' 135 might be compelling. In the
to "re-write" the Brown opinion. The participants included Professors Bruce Ackerman, Jack
Balkin, Derrick Bell, Drew Days, III, John Hart Ely, Catherine MacKinnon, (now-Judge) Michael
McConnell, Frank Michelman, and Cass Sunstein. As Balkin notes, most declined to rely on em-
pirical social science evidence as proof of the unconstitutionality of state-segregated public schools.
Id. Although Professor Ely relied upon the notion of psychological harm, he did not cite to the
sources identified in footnote 11. Id. Professor MacKinnon accepted the social science evidence
relied upon in Brown, though she interpreted the evidence quite differently than did Chief Justice
Warren. Id.
132. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752-53
(2007).; see id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Ryan, supra note 6, at 135-36.
133. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2760.
134. See Ryan, supra note 6, at 148 (describing Justice Kennedy's opinion as "unclear").
135. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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same opinion, however, Kennedy noted that "avoiding racial isolation"
may also constitute a compelling governmental interest. 136  What he
meant by this in any practical sense, however, remains anyone's guess.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that student diversity in the K-
12 setting constitutes a compelling governmental interest, questions of
proof persist for public schools that desire to use student race because of
the narrowly tailored requirement. For example, it is not clear what a
school district needs to do to support a conclusion that non-racial alterna-
tives are unable to deliver desired levels of student diversity. What we
know from Grutter (again, assuming that the higher education sector in-
forms analyses in the K-12 education sector) is that narrowly tailoring
involves an "individualized, holistic" treatment of students. 137  As to
what narrowly tailoring means in the K-12 setting, all we know from
Kennedy's opinion is that what a narrowly tailored program will look
like will be "informed" by Grutter, but that the specific criteria "relevant
to student placement [and admission] would differ."' 38  As Professor
James Ryan aptly noted, what this means for public school districts in-
clined to consider student diversity programs is "left to the imagina-
tion."' 39
2. Social Scientific Uncertainty
Even if one were to momentarily blink at reality and simply assume
that the constitutional law governing public K-12 schools' race-
conscious student diversity policies was clear, predictable, and stable,
social science uncertainty relating to assumptions critical to student di-
versity policies generates an additional set of distinct challenges.
The belief that a diverse student enrollment generated positive stu-
dent outcomes resided at the core of the University of Michigan's de-
fense of its use of race in student admissions. 40  Indeed, this belief is
echoed by an abundance of educator commentary on the pedagogical
value flowing from a racially diverse student body.14' A similar belief
that a more racially integrated K-12 school environment would generate
136. Id. at 2797.
137. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337 (2003).
138. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
139. Ryan, supra note 6, at 136.
140. I am mindful that undergraduate and law school admissions at the University of Michigan
differed in important ways. The social science rationale for the University's race-conscious admis-
sions' programs, however, did not materially differ. Indeed, in both cases the University relied heav-
ily on the Gurin Report.
141. See Goodwin Liu, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Diversity Rationale and
the Compelling Interest Test, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 381, 411; On the Importance of Diversity
in University Admissions (Association of American Universities, New York, N.Y.), Apr. 14, 1997,
available at http://www.aau.edu/issues/diversity4.14.97.html.
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educational benefits was found at the core of the Parents Involved litiga-
tion. This Article does not question whether people of good will rea-
sonably believe that educational benefits flow from student diversity.
Rather, this Article only sets out to assess the empirical support-the
evidentiary foundation-for such a belief.
The social science literature, some of which was pressed into ser-
vice by litigants and amici in their briefs and, more importantly, the Jus-
tices in their opinions, has not yet achieved a firm, stable consensus
about whether educational benefits flow from and are uniquely attribut-
able to greater student diversity. Conclusive evidence on such benefits,
in either direction, does not yet exist. Indeed, prominent supporters of
diversity programs acknowledge as much when they note that the em-
pirical evidence supporting the critical proposition that increased school
integration increases student academic achievement is mixed. 42 Com-
menting on the Grutter decision, Professor James Ryan noted that the
evidence on the influence of student diversity on educational outcomes is
"neither pellucid nor beyond challenge."'' 43  Indeed, Ryan remarked,
"there is a cottage industry of conflicting studies regarding the short- and
long-term benefits of racial integration."1 44 Other reviews of the empiri-
cal evidence received by the courts, including but not limited to the
Gurin Report in Grutter, echo Ryan's observation and conclude that ex-
isting social science research conveys "no clear picture" about purported
benefits attributable to student diversity. 145 This lingering uncertainty,
the absence of a "clear picture," places enormous stress on courts seeking
to enlist empirical evidence into the service of judicial decision-making.
Many factors contribute to the conflicting social science evidence
about the relation between student diversity and achievement. Efforts to
identify and isolate the potential independent influence of specific vari-
ables (especially variables relating to student diversity) on educational
outcomes, such as those involved in the Grutter and Parents Involved
litigation, undertake one of the most complicated research questions
available. Exactly what causes some students to perform well and others
to perform poorly is endlessly debated in a literature that devotes far
more attention to the elementary and secondary school students than their
higher education counterparts. Amid a vigorous debate, a consensus ex-
142. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST.
L.J. 327, 337 (2006); Ryan, supra, note 6, at 143 n.84. But cf, Liu, supra note 141, at 437 ("Virtu-
ally all empirical evidence currently available, though limited, tends to support the diversity ration-
ale.").
143. James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration: Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 327,
337 (2006);
144. Id.
145. Pidot, supra note 81, at 793-94.
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ists that a student's own socioeconomic status, as well as the socioeco-
nomic status of the student's peers, greatly affects the student's academic
achievement and social behavior. 146 Additionally, in the elementary and
secondary school contexts, there is some agreement that good teachers,
strong principals, small schools and class size, and parental involvement
can improve achievement, but the significance of even these variables
remains subject to vigorous debate. 147
Aside from a few general points of emerging consensus on the issue
of what factors influence student academic achievement, a precise under-
standing of student diversity's unique contribution eludes researchers.
Put simply, if the Court sought to engage with one of the most contested
and complex social science research questions available, it is difficult to
identify a stronger candidate than the influence of student diversity on
educational achievement. Direct proof of the contribution, if any, is in
scarce supply.148 Three methodological hurdles confront researchers
seeking to assess the influence of student diversity on academic
achievement. One hurdle involves separating the influence of student
diversity from the array of complex and interacting factors known to
influence student academic achievement. A second hurdle involves con-
trolling for the background assets that every student brings with them
into schools every day. Third, even if some relation between student
diversity and achievement emerged, researchers would also need to as-
sess whether the relation remained stable over time.
Amid all of this legal and social scientific uncertainty, however, a
few pockets of clarity exist on the litigation front. One sure bet, for ex-
ample, is the inevitability of future litigation. Indeed, of Justice Ken-
nedy's obscure concurring opinion in Parents Involved all but assures
further litigation. Equally inevitable is that the specter of litigation will
deflect many risk adverse public school districts away from even consid-
ering constitutionally risky student placement policies that implicate
race. Finally, school districts that desire to implement race-specific stu-
dent placement policies notwithstanding the Parents Involved decision
will likely need to develop a more precise definition of "diversity" as
146. James Coleman was the first to report this phenomenon in his famous 1966 study for the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which has since become known simply as The
Coleman Report. JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE,
EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 301-04 (1966). Scores of subsequent studies have
confirmed Coleman's conclusion. For citations to the literature, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, ALL
TOGETHER Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 25-28
(2001).
147. For a further discussion of research on this point, see KAHLENBERG, supra note 146, at
86-90.
148. See Liu, supra note 141, at 436 (noting that the influence of student diversity on academic
achievement is "not susceptible to direct proof').
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well as a clearer articulation of and support for the purported educational
benefits generated by increased student racial diversity.
V. CONCLUSION
Persisting questions surrounding whether and how the Court should
treat social science evidence when assessing the equal educational oppor-
tunity doctrine pose serious practical problems for public schools seeking
to implement race-conscious policies designed to enhance student diver-
sity. To the extent that the Court seeks to avail itself of social science
evidence in future opinions 149 how should the Court proceed if the un-
derlying empirical evidence is mixed? Does the availability of social
science evidence deflect the Court away from mooring its rationales in
core constitutional principles that resist firm empirical casting? Setting
aside important jurisprudential concerns, today's Court appears unlikely
to reverse its present direction; as such, we can expect to see the strained
relation between judicial decision making and social science evidence
persist.
At a more practical level, the structure of Justice Breyer's dissent in
Parents Involved identifies one critical technical question that warrants
quick judicial resolution. The question involves the appropriate point of
reference from which the Court should assess social science evidence on
the relation between student diversity and educational benefits. Specifi-
cally, must the social science evidence persuasively support the proposi-
tion that educational benefits arise to satisfactorily support a legal
conclusion that student diversity constitutes a compelling governmental
interest? Or, in contrast, must the evidence merely support a school dis-
trict's good faith belief that educational benefits arise?
Although an answer to this reference point question is not obvious,
the legal consequences are considerable. From an evidentiary stand-
point, the two different reference points dramatically differ. Given the
state of social science research, a resolution of the reference point ques-
tion poses obvious substantive implications. One can easily imagine the
Court concluding, as a procedural matter, that the government must pre-
sent persuasive social science evidence to satisfy the evidentiary burden
necessary to establish a compelling governmental interest and least re-
strictive means prongs triggered by strict scrutiny. If school districts are
held to such a standard it is doubtful whether race-specific student as-
signment policies will survive judicial review. Simply put, the current
social science research does not yet appear robust enough to meet that
149. For a quite recent example, see Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008) (No. 07-5439) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring); id., (Scalia, J., concurring).
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burden. On the other hand, if the Court concludes that school districts
need only to present credible social science evidence that would support
its good faith belief that educational benefits arise from and are attribut-
able to student diversity, current social science research, while not con-
clusive, is far more likely to assist school districts in satisfying this bur-
den.
The Brown opinion helped propel the modem public drive toward a
more equitable distribution of educational opportunity. The caustic
language contained in the various opinions in Parents Involved and the
related disputes over Brown's meaning illustrate that the Justices feel
Brown's legacy is worth a fight. To some, including the defendants in
Parents Involved, the ability of public K-12 schools to use student race
is critical to making educational opportunity more equal in the twenty-
first century. Questions about whether and, if so, how public schools can
use student race arc directly back to the Brown opinion, specifically, to
footnote 11. That the seeds of today's contentious questions about ef-
forts to enhance equal educational opportunity relate back to Brown only
deepen the irony surrounding Parents Involved. Although Parents In-
volved reveals sharp differences among the Justices about Brown's
meaning and legacy, one of Brown's legacies emerges with clarity.
Sparked by Brown and refined in periodic cases over time ever since, 150
disputes over how the Court should consider social science evidence,
even in equal educational opportunity cases, have largely displaced dis-
putes over whether the Court should deploy such evidence. If my claim
is correct, disputes about social science evidence's role in constitutional
cases are far from over.
150. See Heise, supra note 9, at 314-15
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